ࡱ> (+%&' bjbj-- vOO&L L 0008hT0"ACCCCCC,~0Voo_,___A_A__*|Ptq90R-<;__\Aoo_L :   SUMMARY REPORT ICG/PTWS-XXIV WORKSHOP: 1100 1800, 24 May 2011 LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD: SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND PREPAREDNESS ASPECTS OF THE SAMOA 2009, CHILE 2010, AND JAPAN 2011 TSUNAMIS I. INTRODUCTION A Technical Workshop was conducted on 24 May 2011 at the Twenty-fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Pacific Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (Annex I). The Workshop provided an opportunity to share experiences and lessons learned from recent locally-destructive tsunamis and to discuss and elaborate on how effective the PTWS, both as a system and individually as countries, has been in providing early, timely warnings to communities at risk. Outcomes from the Workshop are intended to serve as a catalyst for improving the system. The PTWS Working Groups were requested take into account the Workshop discussions and outcomes when formulating their Working Group recommendations to the ICG/PTWS-XXIV. This Report summarizes the Workshop presentations, plenary discussions and recommendations. During the Workshop, Speakers and Working Group chairs were asked to provide their interventions in the context of the PTWS Medium Term Strategy 2009-2013, and the following questions: - How well prepared are countries for the next tsunami? - Are risks known, warnings available, and awareness sufficient for effective response? - What can be done better technically to strengthen national systems? - What are warning center and response operations gaps for local or distant tsunamis? - Are there science research gaps that need to be addressed in order to improve warnings? - Are communications systems adequate for alerting and responding? - Is the current international system of a PTWC-centered Pacific system adequate for warning against tsunamis (both distant and local /regional), or would a regional approach (PTWS as a system of systems) be more effective? The PTWS Medium Term Strategy (MTS), 2009-2013, envisions that the PTWS as an An interoperable tsunami warning and mitigation system based on coordinated Member State contributions that uses best practices and operational technologies to provide timely and effective advice to National Tsunami Warning Centres. As a result, PTWS communities at risk are aware of the tsunami threat, reduce risk, and are prepared to act to save lives. The MTS builds from the ITSU (PTWS) Master Plan (1999, rev 2004) which summarizes the mitigation of tsunami hazards in the Pacific. The PTWS MTS is comprised of three Pillars supported by four foundational elements. The Pillars are: Risk Assessment and Reduction: hazard and risk identification and risk reduction Detection, Warning and Dissemination: rapid detection and warning dissemination down to the kilometer Awareness and Response: public education, emergency planning and response The supporting foundational elements are: Interoperability: free, open and functional exchange of tsunami information Research: enhanced understanding and improved technologies and techniques Capacity Building: training and technology transfer Funding and Sustainability: resources to sustain an effective PTWS Within each Pillar, prioritized activities, guided by the PTWSs foundational elements, should be undertaken with the aim of making populations at risk safer. As the PTWS moves forward in the aftermath of the 2009-2011 events, careful and thoughtful thinking and review are again required to draw out and prioritise the critical, practical, and pro-active recommendations for countries and the PTWS to take action on. II. LOOKING FORWARD: SUMMARY WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS Each PTWS Working Group Chair was asked to look forward and make recommendations for action to improve tsunami warning and mitigation of PTWS countries, cconsidering the recent tsunamis in the context of the ITSU Master Plan (rev 2004) and PTWS Medium Term Strategy (2009-2013). PTWS Working Group and the Task Teams should then align their work plan with the PTWS Medium Term Strategy and PTWS Implementation Plan priorities GOVERNANCE A PTWS comprised of the entire Pacific Ocean needs to continue because of the cross-ocean nature of tsunamis; the PTWS was first started because an international system was identified as a requirement after the 1960 Chile tsunami. The international system of a PTWS is important. But, strengthening of the national and/or regional components are required as a countrys first priority. In each country, Tsunami Warning Center and Disaster Management Offices must work together in a coordinated and seamless manner for effective end-to-end tsunami warning and mitigation Establishment of Tsunami Coordination Committees of stakeholders, comprising at a minimum scientists, warning center, and disaster management, is an practical and important mechanism for building a strong and sustainable system. The PTWS should promote the enhancement of the partnerships between disaster management, warning centers, and science generally in countries, and specifically within PTWS Working Groups and as part of ICG delegations. Within the PTWS, Regional Working Groups are essential to address the end-to-end approach in the appropriate manner considering to the specificities of the region (in terms of geography, networks, communications, culture and language, capacities, and governance). Regional organizations can play an important role in facilitating work plans. Active Regional Working Groups are also essential since travel costs and distances often prevent all countries from attending every ICG/PTWS. AWARENESS AND RESPONSE (WORKING GROUP 3) Tsunami preparedness, through education and awareness and which is pertinent to communities, are the key elements and pillar for saving lives, especially for local tsunamis. Public awareness and education are required beforehand for quick response and both must be maintained for decades or longer because of the infrequency of tsunamis. The development of community-based tsunami hazard maps, evacuation zones, safe places, and routes (with sign posting), based on historical data and numerical modeling of worst case scenarios, will greatly improve the effectiveness of tsunami response. Preparedness through exercise and drills helps to increase readiness and sustain awareness, and should be conducted regularly at the international to community levels. Within organizations, exercises and post-event reviews enable response plans, protocols, and procedures to be tested, reviewed, and where needed, corrected and improved. RISK ASSESSMENT AND REDUCTION (WORKING GROUP 1) There is an urgent priority to identify the largest potential tsunami sources and provide the best estimated parameters for inundation modeling. This is because the last three large tsunamigenic earthquakes were not expected in the short term. Research on historical and paleo-tectonic earthquakes and tsunamis is still needed. Internationally-coordinated and national post-tsunami field surveys are necessary in order to collect theat data that will improve mitigation, e.g., understand impacts, assess hazard and risk, calibrate numerical models, a nd improve warning. Coordination of international tsunami survey teams, at the request of the affected country, is important especially to respect that response, saving lives, and public safety should take highest priority. Pre-event planning, such as through bi-lateral or regional agreements, is essential for success since the days immediately after a destructive tsunami are extremely hectic, and logistics and communications will be less than ideal. Due to the many different modeling softwares being utilized, a report giving an overview of softwares available, their advantages and disadvantages (limitations), and applicability for different scenarios, is needed. Benchmarking standards should be endorsed globally. Development of building design standards for safe use of tall buildings for vertical evacuation is desirable. In places where there is no time to escape inland and to higher ground from a local tsunami, these buildings can serve as temporary vertical refuges. Coastal areas prone to tsunami flooding should be designated as non-build zones for critical infrastructure or schools, hospitals, and first responder facilities. DETECTION, WARNING, AND DISSEMINATION (WORKING GROUP 2) Detection, warning and dissemination all need to be improved, particularly for regional and local events. Sensitivity analyses should be conducted to identify network detection gaps., New geophysical and oceanographic data types and better and faster methods of earthquake source characterisation, along with tsunami wave forecast products, need to be implemented. More robust and affordable communication systems for rapid alert notification, especially in geographically remote locations, are needed. Improvement and expansion of the sea level and seismic networks is still needed. Denser networks result in faster detection, analysis, and threat assessment message issuance. For local tsunamis, faster warnings are required. Pre-calculating impacts for near-shore scenarios should be done for all vulnerable coasts. Warning Centers, supported by their national or regional/international agencies, should invest in efforts to use and understand forecast models to enable more effective alerting (e.g., implement warnings using terminology that providesbased on assessments of threat level assessments by coastal zones). Training must be an important part of the process of moving to a threat level based system. Because forecasts will guide tsunami response, impact estimation, and public safety advice, the various forecast models in use need to be rigorously compared to give confidence in their validity. See Recommendation under Working Group 1. Member states are encouraged to collaborate on the development of inundation modeling tools for response and evacuation planning, and interoperable forecast tools and products for warning. The collaboration can be in the form of joint workshops and training, joint development of compatible forecast products, comparisons of forecast products, or other information sharing. PTWS post-event assessments after major tsunami events must be conducted in order to continue to monitor the effectiveness of the system in terms of accuracy, robustness, timeliness, and usefulness of the international, basin-wide system and its products. III. LOOKING BACK: LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT TSUNAMIS SAMOA, 29 SEPTEMBER 2009 Dr. Ken Gledhill, GeoNet Project Manager, IGNS, New Zealand Filomena Nelson, Principal Disaster Management Officer, NDMO, Meteorology Div, Samoa The earthquake (MW 8.1, 15.509S, 172.034W, USGS) was originally thought to be an outer rise normal event, but now known to be complex and also involving subduction thrusting. The tsunami caused the loss of 192 lives (34 in American Samoa, 149 in Samoa, 9 in Tonga) and extensive damage (in Samoa, American Samoa, northern Tonga and Wallis & Futuna). In Samoa, about 18% of total population was affected, with 143 confirmed deaths, 6 missing, 600 injuries. And 824 families in 51 coastal villages impacted. Most of the casualties were the elderly and young children. There may have been some delay in response due to complacency or curiosity; additionally, it may not have been the advancing wave, but the receding wave that overtook some. The psychological effect was tremendous, and tourism was severely impacted. The total damage was $262 million Tala (USD $104 million). Maximum run up of 12 m in Samoa, almost 18 m in American Samoa, 5 m in Tonga and 4.5 m in Wallis & Futuna. There are lessons and positives from the Samoa-Tonga tsunami of 29 September 2009 for all three PTWS pillars: Pillar 1: Risk Assessment and Reduction. An impressive international effort coordinated by UNESCO/IOC has provided a huge amount of information on tsunami impacts. The earthquake that caused the tsunami was a very complex event composed of two earthquakes a subduction thrust sub-earthquake and an outer rise normal faulting earthquake. Which event came first is still the subject of debate (Lay et al., 2010; Beavan, et al. 2010). This is probably a very infrequent event. Summary: Internationally coordinated post-tsunami surveys are effective in providing data to understand impacts and calibrate forecast models. There is still a lot to learn about large subduction zone earthquakes and their potential to generate tsunami. If the slow subduction thrust had not been accompanied by the normal faulting event, would any warning have been given? Forecast models are becoming very important to tsunami response and impact estimation. The usual methods of estimating arrival times (e.g. TTT) can be a long way out because of the effects of deep ocean trenches and ridges. The various forecast models in use need to be rigorously compared to give confidence in their validity. Currently, risk estimates are based on too little history! Pillar 2: Detection, Warning and Dissemination. The Samoa-Tonga tsunami was mainly a local/regional event with high local and some regional impacts. PTWC took 16 minutes to issue the first message (average at the time was 10 minutes). This was largely due to the density of seismic sensors in the region. GPS data, in combination with seismic data, provided important constraints on deformation; when combined with tsunami modeling and sea level observations to model the damage patterns and inundation, complexity of the event was shown (outer rise normal faulting earthquake triggering subduction thrust earthquake on descending plate interface, or vice versa in time) but not until much later. GPS data were shown to be very useful in understanding rupture and slip for the Chile 2010 and Japan 2011 events, demonstrating the practical utility these data should have for improving tsunami threat assessments. In the two Samoas local warning systems (based initially on the intensity of shaking) worked well. In Tonga and Wallis & Futuna no warnings were issued. For New Zealand forecast models were used for the first time and proved an effective method of estimating local impacts. Summary: Detection, warning and dissemination all need to be improved, particularly for regional and local events to enable faster warnings. Installation of real-time GPS networks, which provide instantaneous relative displacement, should be considered to complement seismic analysis. The SWP region needs more sensor sites. The PTWS Southwest Pacific Seismic Data Sharing Task Team (under WG2) is making progress on seismic sites. Do we need a similar effort for sea level? Warnings need to be faster and be based on forecast models (threat levels and coast zones). We need to both simplify and use newer technology for warning message content. This work is underway and progressing (PTWS Enhancing Tsunami Warning Products Task Team under WG2). Dissemination systems (particularly the last kilometre) remain a problem in the SWP region. The PTWS Emergency Communications Task Team (under WG2) is working on this. How do we notify people at risk in varying situations (from large cities to remote islands)? Pillar 3: Awareness and Response. The on-going awareness campaigns in Samoa and American Samoa clearly saved lives, although how many is hard to estimate. Public awareness and education required for quick response, but it must maintain for decades or longer because of the infrequency of destructive tsunamis. In American Samoa the month leading up to the event had seen an extensive education campaign and this played a part in the level of deaths. Similarly in Samoa, national exercises had been held since 2007, so the public was well informed about how to respond. For the future, continued efforts will be in building more tsunami awareness, and in reviewing and improving national disaster management plan, tsunami response plans and standard operating procedures, thresholds for issuance of tsunami alerts, and better integrating stakeholder response plans. At the community level, evacuation zones and routes based on likely scenarios for future tsunami need to be reviewed and developed. Similar efforts should be rolled out in the rest of this region. Summary: The Samoa-Tonga tsunami demonstrated the success of public education campaigns, but also the reverse. After each event, stakeholder response plans, protocols, and procedures need to be reviewed and improved where necessary. The adoption of community-based evacuation zones and routes (with sign posting) would greatly improve the effectiveness of tsunami response in the SWP region. This fits in well with the move to forecast model based threat levels for pre-defined coastal zones. This approach needs to be rolled out in the SWP region. Training must be an important part of the process of moving to a threat level based system using forecast models for coast zones (levels of threat from a particular event). How do we sustain the high levels of awareness required over the long term? CHILE, 27 FEBRUARY 2010 Captain Patricio Carrasco, Director, SHOA, Chile The earthquake (Mw8.8, 35.91S, 72.73W, USGS) occurred at 0334 local time. Many were woken by the strong earthquake shaking. A total of 524 people were killed, with about 125 estimated from the tsunami about 100 of these were in Constitution where many perished because they were trapped on a islet in the mouth of a river with no evacuation route except by boat in darkness. Clearly, despite it being the middle of the night, people who lived along the coasts must have known that a tsunami might come after a strong earthquake, and they evacuated to safety. SHOA issued a warning to ONEMI, but with communication problems alert notifications did not have reach communities, so its known that pre-event tsunami education and awareness played a large role in saving lives. A number of persons remembered the 1960 local tsunami and knew what to do, and recent reminders from the Indian Ocean (2004), Peru (2007), and Samoa (2009) had all contributed to building awareness on earthquake and tsunamis. Sea level gauges near the epicenter broke (like in Japan on 11 March) so SHOA was not aware of destructive tsunamis, and the ONEMI duty staff did not fully understand and act appropriately given the SHOA tsunami warning message that was issued; as communication systems were down, people needed to act for themselves to save their own lives. While the 2010 Chile tsunami was a near-field tsunami with little time for everyone to react, the March 2011 Japan tsunami was a far-field response for Chile and afforded much time for decision-making and forecast analysis. SHOA monitored the tsunami as it propagated across the Pacific and Easter Island, and consulted its tsunami forecasts. Based on these and PTWC forecasts, it maintained a tsunami warning resulting in the evacuation of the entire Chilean coast. Forecasts proved correct as waves nearly 3 m were observed and damage boats and harbors, and some towns occurred. Challenges continue in educating other government agencies and officials, the public, and the media on what a tsunami is (series of waves), concepts of models (they are estimates, and not exact) and limitations of warnings SHOA and many in Chile expect the next tsunami to hit northern Chile, so efforts to increase preparedness are underway by many. The 2010 and 2011 tsunamis have made everyone more aware and highlighted as a great priority to be prepared for the worst scenario. Pillar 1: Risk Assessment and Reduction. Chiles greatest threat today is from a tsunami north of Puerto Montt (northern Chile). Existing tsunami inundation maps will be reviewed and updated considering the worst-case scenarios. SHOA is working with university scientists through its Chile Tsunami Science Advisory Council, and is building expertise in earthquake seismology working with universities. Pillar 2: Detection, Warning and Dissemination. From the February 2010 event, the ONEMI (NDMO) showed that they did not understand fully what to do when the SHOA tsunami warning message was received. To improve, SHOA is revising its threat criteria and actions in order to make it less confusing and simpler for ONEMI to take action. At the same time, to help is own TWC staff, a warning decision support system is being developed to enable all pertinent data, earthquake and tsunami forecast analyses to be available to the duty staff to make better decisions more quickly. To learn from others, SHOA has visited Japan and India, attended ITIC tsunami trainings, and PTWC and ITIC have visited SHOA. Seismic and sea level monitoring networks have also been significantly improved with the National Seismological Center providing real-time earthquake monitoring, and SHOA has densified and upgraded its sea level network with 35 gauges transmitting at 1-5 minute intervals by satellite; they will also purchase a 2nd DART. Pillar 3: Awareness and Response. Chile SHOA is placing high priority on training of Chile authorities and the public on the threat, evacuation zones, and comprehension and action to SHOA tsunami warning center messages. Because of its local tsunami threat, everyone has to understand what the threat is and how to react without waiting. It is a big effort, and they would like to work with everyone. JAPAN, 11 MARCH 2011 Takeshi Koizumi, Senior International Coordinator for Earthquake and Tsunami Information, JMA, Japan The earthquake (MJMA 9.0, 38.1N, 142.9E, JMA) registered at 6-7 JMA intensity (MMI XII). The earthquake early warning was available starting about 8 seconds after the earthquake, and JMA issued its first national tsunami warning 3 minutes afterward based on a magnitude 7.9. Since the earthquake happened close to the coast and the magnitude was large enough to issue the "Major Tsunami Warning", the maximum threat level, JMA issued the warnings just after the estimation, followed by several updates based on the observation of GPS buoy and sea level gauges on the coast; estimated forecasts had maximums to 10 m nearest to the earthquake source (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima prefectures). The fault rupture of the earthquake, however, continued for more than 3 minutes and resulted in the huge magnitude as 9.0, the final estimation (Mw8.8 was determined 1-2 hours afterward). As observations were received, JMA reported these and upgraded and expanded their national warning to the entire country this was the 1st time in its history for Japan (in operation since 1952). According to sea level records, the 1st waves hit the coast at 0321 JST. The highest wave on tide gauges was over 9.3 m, and several gauges ceased operating soon after the 1st wave hit due to sensor malfunction (broken) or communications outage. Runup maximums range through 25 m with few measurements over 35 meters in narrow inlets. As of 16 May 2011, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reports 23,965 dead or missing. Pillar 1: Risk Assessment and Reduction. Pillar 3: Awareness and Response. In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, which were most severely affected by the tsunami, all local municipalities had developed tsunami hazard maps, alert notification systems for tsunami warning, and guides for evacuation. Efforts to make the knowledge well instilled had been carried out in the region as well. Maps included estimates of how long and high local tsunamis (1986 Show, !933 Sanriku) had impacted. Towns also had extensive sea walls, breakwaters, and water gates as protection. However, in most cases, the largest waves overtopped the protections so tsunamis did inundate home and buildings causing significant damage. Modeling has shown that without these hard countermeasures, inundation and runups would have been much greater and more destructive. Several views have been expressed so far, but careful investigation should be done before we get the concrete lessons learned from this tragedy. Some people in Miyako City may have thought, based on the 1st warning of expected maximum of 3m, that they were safe, and due to communications failures or other problems, may not have received the upgraded warnings. However, a warning does mean to evacuate from the hazard zone, so they should have not stayed. Some may have been saved by the warning. Some may have save themselves by their own knowledge. Some may have waited too long for further confirmation or to gather family, or other reasons. Pillar 2: Detection, Warning and Dissemination. JMA started its Earthquake Early Warning service in 2007, after developing after the 2003 off-Hokkaido earthquake that caused derailment of the Shinkansen train. The EEW determined its 1st location after 8 seconds and continued to work, enabling JMA to issue a Major Tsunami Warning 3 minutes after the earthquake. However, the magnitude was an underestimate, which would be expected since the actual earthquake was M9.0 and so was still rupturing for minutes after. Despite its success, there has been concern that the underestimate, which resulted in a lower wave forecast, may have resulted in the public feeling safe not to evacuate, and as a result, JMA is looking to implement calculating faster and more precise magnitudes so that the first update will be done sooner (during the event, it was done 28 minutes after confirmation by sea level records of a large tsunami). Because of its inability to associate seismic phases correctly, the EEW was providing both real and false earthquake notifications; this has been corrected by JMA. Dissemination of the alerts went according to procedures, with announcements immediately broadcast on NHK and television and radio, and it is assumed (but not confirmed yet) that locally sirens and other notification systems were triggered. Live television footage immediately confirmed for everyone the giant tsunami heading to shore. After the initial wave(s), there may have been problems with local notifications in some places due to communications outage and if batteries powering loudspeakers or sirens lost power. Communications problems also affected data monitoring streams to JMA, so that sea level stations in the tsunami-affected area were not available for determining the full size of the wave, nor when waves were subsiding. LOOKING BACK - TSUNAMI WARNING Chair Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC, USA PTWC provided a review of tsunami warning operations (seismic monitoring and analysis, wave forecast and products, sea level monitoring), emphasizing lessons learned and challenges. The intersessional period witnessed the biggest test of the PTWS since its formation in 1965 with two significant teletsunamis (Chile (cancelled 27:06 hrs), Japan (cancelled 24:50 hrs)) and three major local tsunamis (Samoa/American Samoa/Tonga (cancelled 3:48 hrs), Chile, Japan), reaffirming that local and distant tsunamis are different challenges that require different solutions. Currently, PTWC uses more than 400 seismic stations globally and is able to provide 1st messages in 10-15 minutes. It receives sea level data from coastal stations and deep-ocean sensors globally to confirm a tsunami, and runs three different tsunami forecast models (SIFT/SIM, AFTM, RIFT). He noted that the local tsunami is the biggest challenge for warning centers since: Tsunami waves are largest Time to impact is shortest No observations before impact Details of source important for forecast, but not known before impact Communications infrastructure for official warning may be damaged by earthquake Public awareness and education required for quick response but must maintain for decades or longer In terms of warning center operations, he highlighted warning cancellation as a confusion point for some countries and the media. He noted Tsunami Warning Center can only monitor sea level variations and only where there are reporting coastal gauges Tsunami effects can vary greatly along the coast Tsunami Warning Center cancellation means sea level variations are diminishing and have fallen below dangerous levels on gauges Local authorities must determine when to declare All Clear and allow people to return based upon their evaluation of continuing wave action and/or damages at each location Finally, he reminded everyone that every event presents different challenges to a warning center. e.g., Initially, TWC will underestimate size of great earthquakes if they must issue alerts immediately while the earthquake is still rupturing Slow earthquakes versus normal earthquakes we do not know what causes them, and where or when they will occur It is not easy to forecast local impacts the time is too short and the details of source unknown A tsunami can be caused by the rupture of subsidiary faults or landslide-induced tsunamis in general, the TWC cannot monitor these sources, and each may not trigger a warning since the associated earthquake (if any) may be less than the magnitude threshold Complex resonances and wave interactions at the coast are hard to forecast IV. LOOKING FORWARD: WORKING GROUP ISSUES, PRIORTIES AND ACTIONS PTWS Working Group 1, Risk Assessment and Reduction Chair Dr. Franois Schindel, CEA/DASE, France On the topic of tsunami hazard assessment, the WG 1 Chair noted that the three last large tsunamigenic earthquakes (Samoa 2009, Chile 2010, Japan 2011) were not expected in the short term; their location, fault type, magnitude or dislocation values were not expected. Given this reality, there should be an urgent priority to re-examine globally what the potential tsunami sources are. There is a WG 1 priority to identify the largest potential tsunami sources and provide the best estimated parameters (magnitude, dislocation, size, etc). The question is: Should we expect magnitude 9 events, with 20+ m slip all along subduction zones? To answer this question, research on historical and paleo-tectonic earthquakes and tsunamis need to be conducted. The consequence of this under-prediction for March 11 was that the tsunami waves were much larger than expected (10-30 m height), while sea walls were much lower. It is important that the tsunami impact area from large tsunami waves (> 3 5 m to 10 m) be identified for local, regional, and far-field sources (based on historical data and numerically-simulated inundation maps). In developing inundation maps and for tsunami wave forecasting, a number of different modeling softwares are being utilized. There is a need by PTWS WG 1 (and globally as the new TOWS Task Team) to overview the provision of a summary report giving an overview of what software is available, their advantages and disadvantages (limitations), and applicability for different scenarios. The Indian Ocean endorsed a NOAA benchmarking standard, and that could be used as a model or example to move forward with. Concerning risk reduction, it should be highlighted that one 16 m sea wall in Fudai, Japan, saved 3000 people and all the village houses and facilities from large tsunami waves. However, in most municipalities, the lower sea walls were over-topped. In locations where the tsunami flow depth was greater than 8 m, only reinforced concrete or steel buildings more than 4 floors remained standing. A number of buildings were designated or used as vertical evacuation buildings, which saved lives. In places around the world where there is no time to escape inland and to higher ground from a local tsunami, these types can serve as temporary vertical refuges from tsunami waves. Coastal areas prone to tsunami flooding should also be designated as non-build zones and critical infrastructure or schools, hospitals, and first responder facilities should not be built there. Recommendation ICG/PTWS-XXIV.1 revised WG 1s terms of reference, taking on a work plan that addresses tsunami hazard identification, credible seismic scenarios, model reviews and cooperation on coastal inundation models, and metadata guidance for bathymetry, hydrography, and topography. PTWS Working Group 2, Detection, Warning, and Dissemination Chair Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC, USA; Vice-Chair Daniel Jaksa, Geoscience Australia, Australia The WG 2 Chair noted that for the distant warning, the system worked well for all three events., but there is room for improvement in detection, warning, and dissemination for local and regional tsunamis. The Chair emphasized the three top priorities for the Working Group, which are Enhance tsunami warning products. He noted that the Indian Ocean will be using graphical products, and PTWC will introduce new enhanced products during the intersessional period, including tsunami travel time maps, energy diagrams, coastal forecasts, and maps of historical events and seismicity of the region. Conduct sensitivity analyses of seismic and sea level networks to identify and then fill in gaps to improve detection and analysis, and provide faster alerts. Improve seismic source characterization quicklyeach event was underestimated in size and as a result initial wave forecasts would be underestimated. Real-time GPS shows good potential to directly measure crustal deformation, and finite fault seismic wave inversions for slip distribution are close to being implemented in warning centers. Four other topics came up for discussion in plenary. Shall products be public or private. It was noted that some products need understanding and without sufficient training or explanation could be easily mis-interpreted by the media or public, resulting in conflicting information. The IOTWS will use a private site to provide technical information. However, it was noted that hiding information can cause a problem because youre hiding info that could have been useful to someone, and with respect to media, leaks could occur and cause confusion if information incomplete On media, it was felt that countries should prioritize building relationships and understanding with the local media. Since turnover is so high with the international, and sometimes national media, it would be more productive to train TWC staff to respond correctly, rather than to train media. Japan and JMA have a special arrangement with NHK, which must support disaster prevention; in this case, JMA invites media once a year for brainstorming and training. On enhanced products, it was suggested that this should be discussed also globally under TOWS so that a standard and common set of information or symbols is used on all international products; feedback and ideas from each country on what it would like would also be good. On forecast products noting the interest of many countries, it was suggested that Member states collaborate on the development of interoperable forecast tools and products for warning. The collaboration can be in the form of joint workshops and training, joint development of compatible forecast products, comparisons of forecast products, or other work. Recommendation ICG/PTWS-XXIV.1 revised WG 2s terms of reference and includes WG 2 Task Teams on Emergency Communication (Warning Dissemination), PTWS Exercises (PacWave11), Enhancing Tsunami Warning Products, Sea Level Monitoring, and Southwest Pacific Seismic Data Sharing. PTWS Working Group 3, Awareness and Response Chair David Coetzee, MCDEM, NZ The WG 3 Chair noted that the PTWS has been in existence for 45 years. It is also note that over this time, the PTWS has successfully established itself as a capable and reliable international system for detecting, evaluating, and alerting about distant tsunami, and that over the last decade further advances have been made to enable warning centres to respond still better and faster, thus also effectively warning about regional source tsunami. Yet we still experience catastrophic loss of life during near source tsunamigenic earthquakes as was experienced at three occasions in the inter-sessional period. In all three occasions governments and communities had minutes to respond before the tsunami struck- faster than what many of our warning systems are capable of responding to. In at least one instance people returned to danger areas before the threat was over. The events have yet again shown that in an end-to-end warning system, for the last mile, countries are largely by themselves and that the preservation of life then largely depends on decisions made by governments and communities themselves at the frontline. For distant and regional source events our system can support governments and communities to make the correct decisions but we are constrained by time to provide that support during local source events. So clearly this is where our focus must be - we must ask ourselves how can the PTWS support effective decisions by local TWCs, DMOs and communities to respond appropriately to especially local source tsunami? At least some of the answer to the above must lie with risk reduction, in-country response processes and linkages as well as in public awareness. With the adoption of the PTWS Medium Term Strategy in 2009 we acknowledged these elements with the establishment of Working Groups for Risk Assessment and Reduction, and for Awareness and Response. The terms of reference of these working groups have been agreed at the previous session of the ICG, yet progress appears to be slow. Based on the experience since the previous session, I suggest that the following priorities be considered during the working group meetings on Wednesday and Thursday: Review how we attend to reduction, assessment, awareness and response within the framework of the PTWS. Technical Working Groups 1 and 3 were poorly represented by member states in the previous inter-sessional period and therefore that did not support progress; we need to consider how we can improve that. Consider enhancement of the partnership between science and disaster management in the PTWS. In particular, increase representation of NDMOs in our member state delegations to the ICG and inter-sessional working groups. Consider enhancement of the partnership between NTWCs and NDMOs within our member states. The PTWS cannot make those relationships happen, but it could facilitate if required and it could challenge its member states in this regard. Consider enhancement of tsunami awareness, information and communication in our communities. This responsibility normally rests with NDMOs, and whereas the PTWS as such does not have direct access to local communities, a larger involvement of NDMOs in our activities proves critical yet again. Recommendation PTWS-XXIV-3 outlined priorities and activities for action during the intersessional period, including a focus on capacity building and training, enhancing science and disaster management partnerships with the warning centers, community-focused activities, and coordination of international post-tsunami survey participation with Tsunami National Contacts. Central American Pacific Coast Regional Working Group Chair Dr. Alejandro Rodriquez, INETER, Nicaragua This Group did not present during the Technical Workshop Recommendation PTWS-XXIV-1 rewrote its Terms of Reference to include specific actions, which are to assist countries in the development, improvement and implementation of their national systems, recommend to CEPREDENAC to determine whether Nicaragua or El Salvador (or both) could act as an interim Regional Tsunami Warning Centre under an agreed-on regional communications and warning plan, invite CEPREDENAC to form a Technical Committee for the Development of Regional Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Systems, and facilitate tsunami hazard and risk studies in the region. South East Pacific Regional Working Group Acting Chair, Jorge Cardenas, INOCAR, Ecuador This Group did not present during the Technical Workshop Recommendation PTWS-XXIV-1 confirmed its Terms of Reference consistent with the other PTWS Regional Working Groups. South West Pacific Regional Working Group: Chair Dr. Ken Gledhill, IGNS, New Zealand The Southwest Pacific is a tectonically active region with many large earthquakes; 14% of the worlds observed and confirmed tsunamis have occurred in this source region historically, and local tsunamis are its greatest tsunami hazard. In the past 5 years, there have been 2 deadly tsunamis in the region, with the 29 September 2009 tsunami causing 192 deaths in Samoa, American Samoa, and Tonga, and the 1 April 2007 tsunami causing 52 deaths in the Solomons. On 3 January 2010, the Solomons experienced another local tsunami, but no casualties resulted. The region is comprised of many small island nations. Furthermore, a number of Pacific island countries (both south and north Pacific) are composed of several geographically-dispersed islands adding to the communication challenges for warning dissemination. Currently, in most countries, the National Meteorological or Weather Service serves as the National Tsunami Warning Center (NTWC) and conveys information to the national disaster management office (NDMO) for further public safety advisement. Most depend on the PTWC and/or NWPTAC to provide guidance on their national threat, as they do not have independent capabilities to monitor and analyze earthquake in real-time, nor pre-calculated tsunami simulation databases from which to estimate their tsunami threat. A challenge for this region is in early detection as currently the seismic detection is relatively sparse, thus precluding rapid-enough response for local warning; (currently about 10 minutes from PTWC); the PTWS SW Pacific Seismic Data Sharing Task Team was formed in 2009 to address this gap. The sea level network is also sparse but is being upgraded for more frequent transmission in order to be able to confirm tsunamis more quickly. The SWP WG Chair identified the following priorities for the region: The deployment of more sensors in the region to allow effective regional detection and warning. A question still to be answered is how will regional warnings be done (by whom and in what manner)? Warning Centers, supported by their national or regional/international agencies, should invest in efforts to use and understand forecast models to enable more effective alerting (e.g., implement warnings using terminology that provides threat level assessments by coastal zones). Communities need to designate evacuation zones and develop and identify escape routes and safe assembly areas or shelters based on the different warning center specified threat levels and coastal zones. Continued implementation and sustained support of effective community awareness programmes is essential given the local tsunami threat. A challenge for every country, and especially small island countries, is how do we sustain the necessary high levels of awareness over the long term? How do we sustain the whole end-to-end system long term when events may happen only once per generation or less? Recommendation PTWS-XXIV-1 confirmed the SW Pacific WG Terms of Reference, which are to determine the capabilities and ascertain the requirements of countries for effective end-to-end warning, facilitate hazard and risk studies, upgrades of detection networks and real-time sharing of the seismic and sea level data, and improvement of educational programmes, and facilitate opportunities for capacity building, including the development of a virtual centre of expertise in a multi-hazards context within SOPAC in line with the regional Early Warning Strategy, South China Sea Region: Chair Dr. Mohd Rosaidi Che Abas, MMD, Malaysia The South China Sea is bordered by nine countries (China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and Philippines). The main tsunami hazards are from the trench systems to the west of the Philippines, principally the Manila Trench. Presently, the PTWC and NWPTAC provide interim services for the region. However, to date the numbers of seismic and sea level stations available in real time for monitoring are relatively few making timely detection and warning difficult. The South China Sea Working Group Chair, Dr. M. Rosaidi, Malaysia, emphasized that after March 2011 where a very destructive tsunami was not necessarily expected soon, it is imperative that all possibilities should be considered, and available information should be taken into account even though some records have large uncertainties. For the South China Sea, it is important to share experience and work together, and that an end-to-end approach be adopted this would encompass risk knowledge, efficient and rapid tsunami wave detection, and warning dissemination to a prepared community capable of appropriately responding. It may thus be desirable to develop a Sub-Regional Tsunami Early Warning and Mitigation System. Vietnam agreed. China provided a working paper, Outlook of Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System of South China Sea, to the PTWS-XXIV for discussion by the South China Sea Region Working Group. Recommendation PTWS-XXIV-1 confirmed its Terms of Reference consistent with the other PTWS Regional Working Groups. Recommendation PTWS-XXIV-4 decided to establish a sub-regional Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System for the South China Sea region within the framework of ICG/PTWS using the Outlook as a basis for its establishment. Summary - General Regional Working Group Terms of Reference The Southeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and South China Sea Region have these common working group terms of reference. The Central American Pacific Region has more specific terms of reference. To evaluate country capabilities for providing end-to-end tsunami warning and mitigation services, To ascertain country requirements for tsunami warning and mitigation services, To promote and facilitate tsunami hazard and risk studies, To facilitate cooperation in the establishment and upgrading of seismic and sea level stations and networks and communication systems, and their interoperability in accordance with ICG/PTWS requirements, To facilitate improvement of the education programs on tsunami mitigation, such as the inclusion of hazard and response information in curricula, and development and dissemination of educational materials taking into account regional social, cultural and economical reality, To facilitate capacity building and the sharing of tsunami information, including the free and open exchange of data. V. LOOKING FORWARD - OVERVIEW KEYNOTE Former ITSU and PTWS Chair (3 terms) Dr. Franois Schindel, CEA/DASE, France Dr. Franois Schindel provided an overview based on his long experience in the Pacific and as the Chair of the ITSU and PTWS during the 2000s. The strategy of the PTWS was established in the 1990s and elaborated in the ITSU Master Plan (rev 2004); the PTWS Medium Term Strategy was approved in 2009 (for 2009-2013) and is based on 3 main pillars: i. Hazard and risk assessment and risk reduction; ii. Detection, warning and dissemination; and iii. Awareness and response. Looking backward, we can see that before 2004, the system was improved slowly, but by 2004, much of the basic tsunami awareness documentation was already created and published through ITIC. The three recent tsunamis demonstrate that the following are critical for an effective system: The Preparedness pillar plays a very important role in saving lives; Knowledge about hazard and risk assessment, and improved mitigation, gained from data collected during post tsunami surveys to build a comprehensive database is essential (Recommendation ICG/PTWS-XXIV.3); Assessment of the PTWS of the major tsunami events that provides information about the accuracy, robustness, and timeliness of the system and the baseline for improving (e.g., IOC Technical Series 92 for 27 February 2010 tsunami); Exercises that started at international level with Exercise Pacific Wave 2006 (in 2001, PacWave 11, Recommendation ICG/PTWS-XXIV.2) help to increase readiness and sustain awareness, and so should be organized regularly, such as every 2 years. The Indian Ocean changed totally the situation. After that the number of member states increased from 26 to 32, the seismic and sea level were drastically enhanced, in particular the DART buoys (6 in 2004) grew to a network of 39 stations in 2011. Several new national centers were implemented and PTWC, JMA and WC/ATWC have extended their responsibilities in the Indian Ocean and/or in the Caribbean region and eastern coast of US and Canada. The recent 11 March 2011 Japan tsunami demonstrated that the far field system runs fine, with a caveat to note that the wave heights were mostly moderate in the far field so the tsunami was not as powerful and destructive as in the 1946 and 1960 tsunami thus, we still do not know how well all Member States would manage a larger far-field tsunami. To improve the system, several sub-pillars should be improved. Concerning the geophysical aspects, the parameters of the seismic source should be known very fast. Several techniques exist now to compute quickly and should be implemented by warning centers. Focal mechanism and slip distribution should be made available. For example, dissemination of CMT solutions within 30 minutes should be possible from most earthquakes. The acquisition of real-time GPS data and processing to determine slip distribution shows great useful potential. Several very good networks exist in Japan, US and several countries, and these data streams should be incorporated into warning center operations. All subduction zones should be monitored by GPS stations, especially those close to very large cities. Concerning the sea level component, tsunami confirmation and use of observations to improve forecasting can be made more robust and faster: Coastal stations remain important but are limited in their locations and are contaminated by local conditions. DART buoys provide a clean, deep-ocean signal Sea surface GPS buoys were shown in March 2011 to be a very useful indicator of tsunami severity. This type of buoy completes the tsunameter-type station. The data of all tsunameters should be transmitted in real time to the tsunami warning centers All geophysical and oceanographic data types should be used for real-time forecast Concerning governance, issues should be noted. The need to implement sub-regional systems to improve the sub-regional cooperation is recognized. However, the greatest responsibility lies at the national level, which is where the downstream part (inundation, evacuation, awareness) of the system is. It is critical that National Tsunami (Coordination) Committees be established in most of the countries, in particular those located on or close to subduction zones. Improving a countrys national system is its highest priority, as a strong national system then can contribute to the sub-regional system. Currently, there are 32 Members States of the PTWS, where as in 1999 there were 25. All countries should officially be members for a total of 45 Member States. At the global level, the different groups and task team established in the four regions (PTWS, IOTWS, CARIBE-EWS, NEAMTWS) should find a way to work together, sharing their experiences implementing the system, standardized when necessary and also recognizing differences and priorities in each region (e.g., TOWS Working Group and its Task Teams, e.g., TOWS-IV Summary Report, May 2011) ANNEX I. WORKSHOP BACKGROUND AND AGENDA ICG/PTWS-XXIV WORKSHOP: 1100 1800, 24 May 2011 LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD: SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND PREPAREDNESS ASPECTS OF THE SAMOA 2009, CHILE 2010, AND JAPAN 2011 TSUNAMIS BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW The Workshop provides an opportunity to share experiences and lessons learned from recent tsunamis and to discuss and elaborate on how effective the PTWS, both as a system and individually as countries, has been in providing early, timely warnings to communities at risk. Recommendations from this Workshop will serve as a catalyst for improving the system. The Pacific Ocean and its adjacent marginal seas is the largest, most diverse, and most tsunami-prone of any of the earths oceans. Pacific Ocean nations face and must be prepared for distant, and local tsunami threats. In the past, Member States depended primarily on the international tsunami warning centers (PTWS, NWPTAC, WC/ATWC) for advice to inform National Tsunami Warning Centre decisions. But a new awareness of local and regional threats demands that Member States address these threats through improved and expanded National Tsunami Warning Centre and Disaster Management Office capacities and through formal regional collaboration. The result should be an interoperable network of National and Regional tsunami warning and advisory centres that complement the distant tsunami advice. From the historical record, it is known that most tsunamis have only local or regional impact, yet it is also well-documented that a few powerful local tsunamis can propagate across ocean basins as distant tsunamis with sufficient long-lived energy to cause damage one day later and tens of 1000s of kilometers away. Organized in 1965 in response to the 1960 M9.5 Chile tsunami, the PTWS (formerly ITSU) has successfully shown itself over the last 45 years to be a capable and reliable international system for detecting, evaluating, and alerting Pacific countries to an oncoming distant tsunami. Over the last decade, upgrades in the detection networks and improvements in evaluation techniques have enabled warning centers to respond better and faster, and to thus provide communities with a few extra minutes of lead time to escape the tsunami. In the last three years, three destructive and deadly tsunamis have placed PTWS countries in various levels of warning for distant tsunamis, and locally, five countries were impacted nearly immediately with people having only 10-30 minutes before the 1st large waves hit. In Japan from 11 March 2011, casualty estimates indicate more than 25,000 people lost their lives and about 130,000 people still remain in evacuation shelters. So, while countries in general responded well to the 2010 and 2011 tsunamis as distant sources, there is still a need to reflect on our effectiveness in responding to local and regional tsunamis. The PTWS Medium Term Strategy (MTS), 2009-2013, envisions that the PTWS as an An interoperable tsunami warning and mitigation system based on coordinated Member State contributions that uses best practices and operational technologies to provide timely and effective advice to National Tsunami Warning Centres. As a result, PTWS communities at risk are aware of the tsunami threat, reduce risk, and are prepared to act to save lives. The MTS builds from the ITSU (PTWS) Master Plan (1999, rev 2004) which summarizes the mitigation of tsunami hazards in the Pacific. The PTWS MTS is comprised of three Pillars supported by four foundational elements. The Pillars are: Risk Assessment and Reduction: hazard and risk identification and risk reduction Detection, Warning and Dissemination: rapid detection and warning dissemination down to the kilometer Awareness and Response: public education, emergency planning and response The supporting foundational elements are: Interoperability: free, open and functional exchange of tsunami information Research: enhanced understanding and improved technologies and techniques Capacity Building: training and technology transfer Funding and Sustainability: resources to sustain an effective PTWS Within each Pillar, prioritized activities, guided by the PTWSs foundational elements, should be undertaken with the aim of making populations at risk safer. In the context of the PTWS Master Plan and Medium Term Strategy, key questions to consider and answer in this Workshop will be: How well prepared are countries for the next tsunami? Are risks known, warnings available, and awareness sufficient for effective response? What can be done better technically to strengthen national systems? What are warning center and response operations gaps for local or distant tsunamis? Are there science research gaps that need to be addressed in order to improve warnings? Are communications systems adequate for alerting and responding? Is the current international system of a PTWC-centered Pacific system adequate for warning against tsunamis (both distant and local /regional), or would a regional approach (PTWS as a system of systems) be more effective? As the PTWS moves forward in the aftermath of the 2009-2011 events, careful and thoughtful thinking and review are again required to draw out and prioritise the critical, practical, and pro-active recommendations for countries and the PTWS to take action on. Workshop Organizing Committee Tanya Ivelskaya (Russian Federation) Dr. Laura Kong (ITIC) Dr. Franois Schindel (France) Anglica Muoz (Nicaragua) PROVISIONAL AGENDA Session 1 (1100-1105): Workshop Overview (Tanya Ivelskaya, Organizing Committee) Goals, Outcomes, Format Each Speaker or Panelist is requested to provide a short (0.5-1.0 page) written summary for inclusion in the Workshop Report. Session 2 (1105-1300): Looking Back: Highlights and Lessons Learned from Recent Tsunamis (100 min, 15 min each) Each speaker is requested to discuss the event in the context of the PTWS Medium Strategy pillars as it occurs in their own country or region. Conclusions should identify what aspects of the pillars have contributed to the success of the PTWS and national systems, and also what lack of action or gapsin the pillars is reducing the timeliness, reliability, accuracy, or efficiency of tsunami warning and response. Thoughts can focus at the local, national, and/or international levels. 29 September 2009: Samoa, American Samoa, Tonga Tsunami - Dr. Ken Gledhill, GEONET Project Manager, Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences, New Zealand 27 February 2010: Chile Tsunami - Captain Patricio Carrasco, Director, SHOA, Chile 11 March 2011: Japan Tsunami - Takeshi Koizumi, Senior Coordinator for International Earthquake and Tsunami Information, JMA, Japan Tsunami Warning Perspectives - Dr. Charles McCreery, Director, PTWC, USA Tsunami Response and Preparedness Perspectives - Filomena Nelson, Principal Disaster Management Officer, Samoa Meteorological Division, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Samoa General Discussion (15 min) Session 3 (1430-1600): Looking Forward: Regional and Technical Priorities of Action Panel Discussion (70 min, 10 min each) Format: Each Panelist should represent his WG theme. Panelist is given 5 minutes to respond. This is followed by 5 minutes discussion. If slides are used, no more than 2-3 should be used. Panelists (*) speaking in other sessions may choose to provide only very brief remarks. Question: In the next 5-10 yrs, considering the recent tsunamis in the context of the ITSU Master Plan (rev 2004) and PTWS Medium Term Strategy (2009-2013), what are the top three (3) priorities of practical and doable action at the local, national, and/or international level to save lives and property? Are there roadblocks or challenges to getting them done? Panelists: PTWS Working Group Chairs PTWS Working Group 1, Risk Assessment and Reduction, Chair Dr. Franois Schindel, CEA/DASE, France (*) PTWS Working Group 2, Detection, Warning, Dissemination, Chair Dr. Charles McCreery, PTWC (*) PTWS Working Group 3, Awareness and Response, Chair David Coetzee, MCDEM, NZ Central American Pacific Coast Regional Working Group, Chair Dr. Alejandro Rodriquez, INETER, Nicaragua South East Pacific Regional Working Group, Chair, Jorge Cardenas, INOCAR, Ecuador South West Pacific Regional Working Group, Chair Dr. Ken Gledhill, IGNS, NZ (*) South China Sea Working Group, Chair Dr. Mohd Rosaidi Che Abas, MMD, Malaysia General Discussion (20 min) Session 4 (1630-1715): Keynote (25 min), Discussion (20 min) Looking Forward Where are we going? 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